Abstract: That Kant owed much to Rousseau has long been known. Yet some of Kant's most significant debts to Rousseau still await appreciation. This paper offers an examination of two key understudied writings from the 1760s in order to provide a more comprehensive account of Kant's debts to Rousseau. In focusing on these texts, it particularly aims to supplement the existing accounts of Kant's debts to Rousseau which have largely focused on concepts of human dignity and human equality or on concepts of gender and gender relations, and to demonstrate the degree to which Kant read Rousseau as a theorist of epistemic development. In so doing it offers a reconsideration of Kant's own philosophical development, and a reconsideration of the philosophical significance of Rousseau's epistemology.
Introduction
The crucial significance of Kant's encounter with Rousseau in the 1760s has long been appreciated.1 Recent scholars have added much to this picture, thanks in part to renewed focus on Kant's Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) and his "Remarks on the Observations" (1765); the editors of a new English translation of the Observations and "Remarks" thus rightly note that it is in the "Remarks" that one finds Kant's "most sustained and explicit engagement with Rousseau", replete with over twenty direct references to Rousseau, and so too the editors of a new critical guide to the Observations and "Remarks" similarly note that taken together the two works cast "an exceptionally revealing light on Rousseau's early and ongoing influence on Kant."2 Small wonder then that students of the Kant-Rousseau connection have tended to focus on these texts.
But what do the Observations and "Remarks" reveal of Rousseau's influence on Kant? Two particular themes have tended to be emphasized.3 The first is the significance of Kant's encounter with Rousseau for his emerging understanding of human equality and human dignity. Thus in what may be the best known passage in the "Remarks", Kant observes, I am myself a researcher by inclination. I feel the entire thirst for cognition (Erkenntnis) and the eager restlessness to proceed further in it, as well as the satisfaction at every acquisition. There was a time when I believed this alone could constitute the honor of humankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau has set me straight. This blinding prejudice vanishes, I learn to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this consideration could impart a value to all others in order to establish the rights of humanity. (R 96; Ak 20:44)4 Less frequently quoted but equally important is Kant's related observation that "only the doctrine of Mr. Rousseau can bring it about that even the most learned philosopher, with his knowledge, earnestly regards himself, without help from religion, as no better than the common man" (R 187 f.; Ak 20:176). The personal significance of these statements can hardly be overemphasized; as others have extensively documented, in the first of these passages Kant credits Rousseau as primary inspiration for his mid-life personal transformation and reconsideration of his very enterprise as a philosopher.5 Yet the most important side of these remarks is substantive, for here Kant credits Rousseau not only for his personal reorientation but also for introducing him to several core concepts of his mature ethics, including his understanding of human dignity and human equality, and his understanding of freedom as reason's capacity to serve not simply as an instrument to the satisfaction of our desires but as a faculty of ends.6
Alongside these concepts of equality and dignity and freedom, scholars have also found in the Observations and "Remarks" another perhaps less welcome side of Rousseau's influence on Kant. This concerns Kant's understanding of gender and of gender relations. Kant explicitly dedicated the third section of the Observations to an inquiry into gender differences, and as many of Kant's admirers have long lamented, this account and the related "Remarks" contain several observations bordering on misogyny.7 It has also long been appreciated that Kant's specific observations on these fronts were demonstrably influenced by his readings of Rousseau's Emile and Julie in particular.8 In light of this clear influence, several prominent scholars have placed the blame for Kant's disparaging and seemingly incongruous remarks about women squarely on his unfortunate adoption of Rousseau's prejudices.9
Kant's debts to Rousseau on these two fronts are thus beyond dispute. Yet these hardly exhaust the extent of Kant's debts. What follows aims to supplement existing accounts of these two areas of influence by focusing on an overlooked side of Kant's careful engagement with Rousseau: namely the significance of Rousseau's epistemology and his theory of cognitive development for the evolution of Kant's own thoughts on these fronts -an influence that has received almost no attention, so far as I know.10 But to see this requires supplementing our familiar focus on the Observations and "Remarks" with careful examination of two other key if much less well-known texts of the 1760s: Kant's Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes or "Essay on the Maladies of the Head", and his Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesung in dem Winterhalbjahre von or "Announcement of the Organization of His Lectures in the Winter Semester 1765-66".
Neither of these texts has received significant attention to date, even from Kant specialists. The "Essay on the Maladies of the Head" has been almost entirely neglected; to the degree that it has received attention at all it has largely 7 See e. g. O 36 f.; Ak 2:229 f. and R 101; Ak 20:53; for a helpful recent overview see esp. Frierson 2013, ch. 4 . 8 See esp. Shell 2002 and cf. 1996, 87-97 . Also helpful in this vein are Zammito 2002, 125-31; and Kneller 2006 . 9 See esp. Okin 1982, 78-82; Mendus 1992, 167; and Pateman 1988, 168 (Henrich 1963, 431) , but this theme is not reintroduced in the related piece published soon after (Henrich 1966). been in the context of studies of Kant's writings on psychological disorder, a set of writings that include his lecture "On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body" (1786) and the third part of the Conflict of the Faculties (1796).11 The Nachricht has not fared better; the little attention it has received has focused on how it might illuminate Kant's aims in his courses on physical geography and practical anthropology and his concern to teach Weltweisheit or worldly wisdom.12 But what has yet to be appreciated is the value of these texts for the insight they offer into Kant's engagement with Rousseau in this crucial period.13 What follows thus focuses on these two texts -and also examines several other contemporaneous writings, including the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766) and Inaugural Dissertation (1770), as well as the Observations and "Remarks" -to provide another side of the story of Kant's engagement with Rousseau, and especially in an effort to call attention to the way in which this engagement particularly shaped Kant's views on cognitive development and the cultivation of intellectual virtue.
Natural Man, Civilized Man, and Cognition
Among the most central and most obviously Rousseauan themes in Kant's ethical writings of the 1760s is the distinction between natural man and civilized man. In developing this distinction -and especially in arguing that natural man was largely civilized man's superior -Rousseau's influence is ubiquitous and is especially evident in the "Remarks". When Kant suggests that "human nature has now acquired such a desolate form" that its "natural foundations become dubious and unrecognizable (unkenntlich)" (R 98; Ak 20:48), he echoes Rousseau's lament in the Discourse on Inequality (or the second Discourse) that "all the changes that the sequence of times and things must have produced in his original constitution" have altered human nature to the point that it has "changed its appearance to the point of being nearly unrecognizable (méconnaissable)" (SD 3:12; OC 3:122) . So too when he criticizes civilized man for having "lost the feeling of simple pleasures" and for now believing "that the corruptions that exist in the civilized state also exist in the state of simplicity" (R 73; Ak 20:11), he replicates Rousseau's charge against Hobbes and others who have "carried over to the state of nature ideas they had acquired in society: they spoke about savage man and they described civil man" (SD 3:19; OC 3:132) . Similarly Kant's claim that "in the natural state one can be good without virtue" whereas "the occasion for virtue" later arises "because so many unnatural desires are found in the civilized condition" (R 73; Ak 20:11) clearly replicates Rousseau's ubiquitous distinction between innocence or natural goodness and the corruptions that make virtue necessary. And when Kant identifies the specific corruptions to which civilized man is susceptible he does so in terms directly drawn from Rousseau; thus his claim that "the corruption of our time can be boiled down to this, that no one demands to be content with himself, or also good, but instead to appear so (oder auch gut zu sein sondern so zu scheinen)" (R 122; Ak 20:84) restates Rousseau's notorious claim that the conditions of civil society render it "necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact was", with the consequence that "to be and to seem to be became two altogether different things (être et paraître devinrent deux choses tout à fait différentes)" (SD 3:51; OC 3:174) .14 The distinction between natural goodness and civilized corruption that is so prominent a part of the "Remarks" is also prominent in the "Essay". But in the latter text these claims take on an additional depth as a result of the particular direction in which Kant develops them. Like the "Remarks", the "Essay" also focuses on the question of civilized corruption; in this vein it begins by calling attention to the distinction between "the simplicity and frugality of nature" and the "artificial constraint and the luxury of a civil constitution" (EMH 65; Ak 2:259) -a line that, as has been righty noted, "emulates rhetorically the powerful opening words of the Emile"15 -and goes on to lament the fact that "the degenerate human being has left his natural place" and is now confined to that world of "intrigue and false devices" which "have gradually become customary maxims in civil society" (EMH 67-68; Ak 2:261-262). Kant even goes so far as to 14 On Kant's debts to Rousseau's conception of civilized corruption, see also Velkley 2013, 94 f. 15 Goetschel 1994, 83 ; on Kant's debt to Rousseau here, see also Zammito 2002, 191 f.; and Munzel 2012, 168 f.; and Schmucker' s claim that in these passages, "stoßen wir fast unvermittelt auf den urrousseauschen Gedanken" (Schmucker 1961, 146) . Goetschel also rightly notes that "Kant closes his Rousseauean circle in the Versuch" by paraphrasing Rousseau's comparison of the natural and civil states; see Goetschel 1994, 87. pass direct judgment on his fellow citizens using Rousseau's terms: "I live among wise and well-mannered citizens, that is to say, among those who are skilled at appearing so." As in Rousseau's civilized society Kant's is one in which "eagerness to speak" of reason and virtue is thought sufficient to "dispense instructed and polite persons from bothering with their possession" (EMH 65; Ak 2:259).
The significance of Rousseau's comparison of natural man and civilized man for Kant is thus obvious. But what is less obvious, though crucial to understanding Kant's debts, is the degree to which Kant understood the distinction of natural man and civilized man not merely as one of sentiments but rather as one of cognition. And it is here that attending to the "Essay" and the "Announcement" is especially valuable, for in developing his comparison of natural and civilized man in these texts Kant not only focuses on the question of cognition, but does so in a way that bears the distinctive mark of Rousseau's influence. Some hint of this can be found in the "Remarks", in which the very "simplicity of nature" is itself defined as "the amount of cognitions (Erkenntnisse) and other perfections required for the satisfaction of nature" (R 69; Ak 20:6). But the "Essay" presents the fundamental distinction on this front even more clearly:
The human being in the state of nature can only be subject to a few follies and hardly any foolishness. His needs always keep him close to experience and provide his sound understanding (gesunden Verstande) with such easy occupations that he hardly notices that he needs understanding for his actions. Indolence moderates his coarse and common desires, leaving enough power to the small amount of the power of judgment (wenigen Urteilskraft) which he needs to rule over those desires to his greatest advantage. From where should he draw the material for foolishness, since, unconcerned about another's judgment as he is, he can be neither vain nor inflated? Since he has no idea at all of the worth of goods he has not enjoyed, he is safe from the absurdity of stingy avarice, and because not much wit finds entrance into his head, he is just as well secured against every craziness. In like manner the disturbance of the mind can occur only seldom in this state of simplicity. (EMH 75; Ak 2:269) Here Kant of course replicates several elements of Rousseau's basic distinction between natural and civilized man, including especially the indolence of the one and the avarice and solicitude for opinion of the other.16 But Kant also replicates a less obvious but central side of Rousseau's distinction here. In drawing this distinction, Kant goes beyond the familiar distinction of natural man and civil man on the basis of sentiment and extends it to questions of cognition; thus what ultimately separates natural man from civilized man is "sound understanding" -an understanding that specifically renders feeble his "power of judgment", that leads him to stay "close to experience", that incapacitates him from forming an "idea" of the worth of goods beyond those necessary for physical survival, and prevents him from cultivating the "wit" that engenders psychological maladies. And in making such claims Kant closely follows Rousseau; indeed the "Essay" passage quoted above replicates several of Rousseau's explicit claims on this front, including especially his claims that the savage's "modest needs are so easily found at hand, and he is so far from the degree of knowledge necessary for acquiring greater knowledge, that he has neither foresight nor curiosity" (SD 3:28; OC 3:144) , and his claim that savage man "had only the feelings and intellect (les sentiments et les lumières) suited to that state; he felt only his true needs, saw only what he believed he had an interest to see; and his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity" (SD 3:40; OC 3:160) .
Attending to Kant's rendering of the distinction between natural and civilized man is useful for what it reveals of his engagement with Rousseau, and also for what it can reveal of Rousseau's own largely overlooked focus on epistemological questions.17 In addition, Kant's rendering of this distinction also helps to clarify one of the questions with which he was engaged in the 1760s. As the texts quoted above make clear, Kant was troubled by what he took to be the corruption of his society, and of which he found evidence not simply in the moral sentiments of civilized man but also in the particular way in which the cognitive faculties of civilized man have developed. Indeed it is this concern -and Kant's associated efforts to describe a practical remedy for this corruption -that unifies many of his writings of the mid-1760s, and attests to the degree to which he inherited from Rousseau not only his understanding of the problem that education in civilized society must confront but also his understanding of the essential elements of the necessary solution.
The Faculties of Cognition and the Stages of Education
In one of the most strikingly direct statements in the "Remarks", Kant insists that "the education of Rousseau is the only means to help civil society flourish again" (R 187; Ak 20:175). Kant thus clearly regarded Rousseau as a key resource not only in diagnosing society's illnesses but also in establishing their cure. At the same time, however, Kant was deeply aware of the insufficiencies of Rousseau's program regarded as a practical response. Earlier in the "Remarks" Kant took Rousseau's educational program to task on this front, insisting "it is unnatural that a human being should spend the great part of his life in order to teach one child how it should live some day." Given the impracticability of trying to formulate an army of private tutors fashioned in the image of Jean-Jacques, Kant insisted that "schools are therefore necessary". But describing such a school was itself a project that Rousseau conspicuously failed to pursue; thus Kant's lament that "one would wish that Rousseau would show how schools can arise from this" (R 86; Ak 20:29). Yet Kant's lament was hardly an idle one. As many have noted, in later years Kant explicitly took up this flag, and his practical support for Basedow's Rousseau-inspired "Philanthropinum" clearly attests to his commitment to institutionalizing Rousseau's project. Kant's lecture courses on pedagogy from the 1770s and 1780s likewise attest to his commitment to Rousseau's educational project, and indeed the published version of the Lectures on Pedagogy has been recently and rightly read as offering a conception of moral rectitude that "accords almost perfectly with the depiction of Emile".18 Yet attending to Kant's writings of the mid-1760s provides good reason to think that he hardly waited until the 1770s to launch this project. In what follows I thus want to argue that these writings, and especially the "Essay" and "Announcement", attest to the degree to which even in the 1760s Kant had begun to reflect on how his own teaching might further one side of the project described in Rousseau's Emile.
Seeing this requires turning to the "Announcement". The formal aim of the "Announcement" was to generate a fee-paying audience for Kant's lectures; as Privatdozent Kant was not entitled to a regular salary and depended for his support and financial security on the tuition fees that students attending his courses paid him directly.19 But closer examination of the text reveals it to be much more interesting and indeed more philosophically significant than a mere exercise in advertising. For in fact it may well be in this text, more than any other text of the 1760s, that we find the clearest evidence of Rousseau's influence. Rousseau, to be sure, is never named in the text -unlike Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Hume, who Kant says his ethics lectures will examine, and Meier and Baumgarten, whose textbooks will organize his logic and metaphysics lectures. Yet even if these authors provided the matter on which Kant would lecture, Rousseau clearly provided the form.
Rousseau's influence in the "Announcement" equals and perhaps eclipses his influence in the "Essay". The introduction to the "Announcement" directly replicates several of Rousseau's most distinctive educational principles; Kant's claim that "it is possible to make public education more adapted to nature, even though it will not be possible to bring it into perfect harmony with it" (AL 291; Ak 2:305) repeats Rousseau's claims that he seeks not to replicate nature through education but to create what he calls a "natural man in society" (see also E 13:164; OC 4:249) -a concern that Kant would himself, in an unpublished note, identify with Rousseau, suggesting that Rousseau's portrait of "Emile or the ethical human being" is dedicated not simply to restoring nature but to "art or cultivation of powers and inclinations which harmonize the most with nature", and through which "the natural perfection is improved" (NF 419; Ak 19:99; cf. EMH 75 f.; Ak 2:269 f.).20
Yet the aspect of Emile on most conspicuous display in the "Announcement" concerns the question of how education is best organized. One of Rousseau's most constant tropes in Emile is that each educational objective, as well as the techniques to be employed in achieving such objectives, must be suited to the state of the child's development -and specifically its cognitive developmentat a given time. Indeed one of the central organizing principles of Emile is the claim that what is suitable at one point is unsuitable at another -a claim Rousseau uses as leverage to criticize, among other practices, early teaching of foreign languages, encouragement of reading, and neglect of early physical education. Kant himself replicates this claim, and in fact dedicates the opening lines of the "Announcement" to presenting this characteristically Rousseauan position:
There is always a certain difficulty involved in the instruction of young people, and it is this: the knowledge one imparts to them is such that one finds oneself constrained to outstrip their years. Without waiting for their understanding (Verstandes) to mature, one is obliged to impart knowledge (Erkenntnisse) to them, which, in the natural order of things, can only be understood by minds which are more practiced and experienced (nur von einer geübteren und versuchten Vernunft).21 (AL 291; Ak 2:305) This accords with one of Rousseau's most common observations throughout Emile, namely the necessity of following "nature's order" in education and thus 20 Shell and Velkley 2012b, 2. 21 Wilson, in the context of examining the Nachricht for its possible insights into Kant's lectures on physical geography, also calls attention to the importance of Kant's sensitivity to order (though not its Rousseauan resonances), in emphasizing that Kant's focus on order was an effort "to make up for the lack of historical and social experience in his students, since this knowledge can normally only be anticipated in adults with age and life experiences" (Wilson 2006, 12) . not trying to do too much too soon, before a child's mind has been adequately prepared for it (E 13:255; OC 4:359) . This claim left an impression on Kant, evident in the degree to which both the "Announcement" as well as other texts of the 1760s testify to his sensitivity to the different ways in which the human mind works at different ages (e. g. R 143; Ak 20:115).
Kant thus agrees with Rousseau that education must follow nature's order. Yet it is in the way that he conceives the specific stages of this order that we see the full extent of his debts to Rousseau on this front. The "Announcement" presents two key statements of this order. In the first, Kant explains:
The natural progress of human knowledge (menschlichen Erkenntnis) is as follows: first of all, the understanding develops by using experience to arrive at intuitive judgments (durch Erfahrung zu anschauenden Urteilen), and by their means to attain to concepts. After that, and employing reason, these concepts come to be known in relation to their grounds and consequences. Finally, by means of science, these concepts come to be known as parts of a well-ordered whole. This being the case, teaching must follow exactly the same path. The teacher is, therefore, expected to develop in his pupil firstly the man of understanding (den In the second statement Kant reiterates this progression, and in so doing provides important additional detail:
The rule for proceeding is, therefore, as follows. Firstly, the understanding must be brought to maturity and its growth expedited by exercising it in empirical judgments (Erfahrungsurteilen) and focusing its attention on what it can learn by comparing the impressions (die verglichene Empfindungen) which are furnished by the senses (Sinne). It ought not to venture any bold ascent from these judgments and concepts to higher and more remote judgments and concepts. It ought rather to make its way towards them by means of the natural and well-trodden pathway of the lower concepts, for this path will gradually take it further than any bold ascents ever could. But all this should be done, not in accordance with that capacity for understanding which the teacher perceives, or thinks he perceives in himself, and which he mistakenly presupposes in his pupils, but rather in accordance with that capacity for understanding which must of necessity be generated in that faculty by the practice which has just been described. (AL 292; Ak 2:306) Two elements of these accounts are especially prominent: first, that education must proceed in stages; and second, that these stages are defined by the relative degree of acquisition of specific epistemic capacities. Hence, Kant's insistence that education must begin by cultivating the "understanding" through "experience" or "empirical judgments" which focus on comparison of "the impressions which are furnished by the senses", and only subsequently proceed to "higher and more remote judgments and concepts" via "the natural and well-trodden pathway of the lower concepts". This same classificatory schema is also on prominent display in the "Essay". Here Kant proposes a tripartite scheme of classifying psychological illness: "[…] first, the reversal of the concepts of experience (Erfahrungsbegriffe) in derangement, second, the power of judgment brought into disorder by this experience in dementia, third, reason that has become reversed with respect to more universal judgments in insanity" (EMH 70; Ak 2:264). This classification of maladies by experience, judgment and reason replicates the stages of cognitive development in the "Announcement". But what is especially important here is the insight that Kant's reliance on this tripartite classificatory scheme offers into his methods as a teacher and his debts to Rousseau. For in making this claim, Kant directly restated the precise method of education that Rousseau outlined at the start of Emile and which serves to organize its educational project:
We are born with the use of our senses (nous naissons sensibles), and from our birth we are affected in various ways by the objects surrounding us. As soon as we have, so to speak, consciousness of our sensations, we are disposed to seek or avoid the objects which produce them, at first according to whether they are pleasant or unpleasant to us, then according to the conformity or lack of it that we find between us and these objects, and finally according to the judgments we make about them on the basis of the idea of happiness or of perfection given us by reason. These dispositions are extended and strengthened as we become more capable of using our senses and more enlightened (plus sensibles et plus éclaires), but constrained by our habits, they are more or less corrupted by our opinions. Before this corruption they are what I call in us nature. (E 13:163; OC 4:247 f.) Here Rousseau lays out his project in Emile: not merely to preserve nature from the corruptions of opinion, but to develop the natural epistemic faculties of the human being in accord with the ordered progression from sensation and experience to comparison and judgment that has been dictated by nature as the proper course for our cognitive development. The significance of this understanding of the stages of cognitive development for Rousseau cannot be overestimated, insofar as it serves to organize the whole of Emile (Hanley 2012) . But its significance for Kant is equally great, insofar as the "Announcement" and the "Essay" together replicate this schema. It should be noted that these concerns are also evident in the "Remarks" as well; the insistence there "that sentiment (Empfindung) must be developed long before the concept" of what is right (R 84; Ak 20:26) has itself, in a rare reference to the significance of Rousseau for Kant's conceptions of cognition, been rightly described as establishing an order that "agrees with the way the tutor proceeds in Rousseau's Emile".22 But this runs much deeper than a single "Remark", and taken in conjunction with the passages from the "Announcement" and "Essay" cited above, the claims suggest the degree to which Kant's early treatments of the relationships between empirical sensation, judgment and reason -the relationships that would of course prove central to the epistemological claims on which Kant would later focus in both his an thropological and his critical writings -replicate the same categories that form the foundation of Emile and emerge also in Kant's thought at the same time that he is most directly engaged with Emile. On such grounds it seems reasonable to suggest that Kant's lasting debts to Rousseau extended to his epistemology as well, and that his tripartite scheme of cognition into knowledge, desire and feeling that is especially characteristic of his conceptions of psychology in the 1770s was laid in the mid-1760s in his engagement with Rousseau.23
Sensation, Judgment, and Fanaticism
To this point it has been argued that Kant inherited from Rousseau the basic organizing categories of his conception of epistemic development in the 1760s. Yet this prompts another question: what elements of Emile's epistemic development particularly interested Kant, and why? One element prominent in and common to Rousseau's and Kant's conceptions of pedagogical method is the primacy of sensation. The claim that all epistemic and moral cultivation must necessarily begin with sensation is an ubiquitous foundational principle in both the second Discourse and in Emile; hence Rousseau's claims that not only does the "entire learning" of children consist in sensation (E 13:243; OC 4:345), but also that "since everything which enters into the human understanding comes there through the senses, man's first reason is a reason of the senses (une raison sensitive); this sensual reason serves as the basis of intellectual reason" (E 13:264; OC 4:370), and that "whatever the moralists may say about it, human understanding (l'entendement humain) owes much to the passions", for "it is by their activity that our reason is perfected" (SD 3:27; OC 3:143) . This serves to reinforce the claim suggested above, namely that Rousseau's virtue epistemology is self-consciously 23 On this tripartite classificatory scheme in the 1770s, see esp. Shell 2009, 89. Shell's accompanying note (355 n. 10) rightly and crucially notes that Kant's inclusion of feeling here marks an important departure from the Baumgarten text, leading her to suggest that even if "the proximate source of Kant's treatment of feeling as a basic faculty" would seem to be Mendelssohn, "its deeper inspiration" should be traced to the treatment of sentiment in Emile and the second Discourse -a position to which the present argument is clearly sympathetic and for which it has aimed to provide textual evidence. built on a two-stage model, in which first priority is given to the training of the senses, and only afterwards is attention given to the cultivation of those cognitive faculties which draw on the materials afforded by sensation; in Rousseau's terms "sensual reason" is necessarily prior to "intellectual reason". This aspect of Rousseau's project tends to be underemphasized today, yet it was clearly seen and closely followed by Kant. In several writings of the 1760s, Kant adopts this same two-stage model, emphasizing that the senses furnish the impressions that form the grounds of our ideas. In an unpublished fragment thought to date to the late 1760s, Kant thus explains,
The primary elements of our cognitions are sensations (Empfindung). This is what one calls those representations in which the mind is regarded as merely passive, acted upon by the presence of an object. They comprise the matter, as it were, of all our cognition. (NF 483; Ak 5:268)
The suggestion here is that cognition has a sensory foundation; in Kant's language, sensations are the "primary elements" of cognition. Kant of course does not here go so far as Rousseau in suggesting that there could exist something like "sensual reason" as opposed to "intellectual reason" -as he does in the An thropology, in which Kant explicitly distinguishes the "sensuous cognitive faculty" from the "intellectual cognitive faculty" (A 251; Ak 7:140).24 Here his concern is rather to establish the way in which the sensations as matter and the understanding as form come together to establish the unity of reason. Yet his conception of reason's unity suggests a lexical priority of sensation consistent with Rousseau's own views. This priority of sensation is also suggested in a related fragment, in which it is claimed that "the first faculty of the human soul and the condition of the rest is sensibility (der Sinn), by means of which the soul receives representations as effects of the presence of the object and does not produce them itself" (NF 483; Ak 15:268). Yet in his writings from the 1760s, this commitment is perhaps most explicit in Kant's published claim that "the impression of the senses itself precedes all judgment of the understanding" (DSS 335; Ak 2:347; cf. DSS 347; Ak 2:360 f.). 24 Kant's recurrence to this distinction presents a question concerning how his engagement with Rousseau may have evolved over the course of his career. As others have suggested, Kant's engagement with Rousseau's Julie and Emile seems to shift over the course of the 1760s to a more sustained engagement with Rousseau's writings on freedom, and especially his Social Contract; on this front, see esp. Frierson 2012, 73-75, Ferrari 1979, 188 n. 55, and 211-13; and Hanley 2014 , which treats this question with specific regard to Kant's views on marriage. Yet Kant's engagement here and elsewhere in the Anthropology with categories familiar to him from his early engagement with Emile suggests the robustness of this early engagement.
These claims are significant for at least three reasons. First, these claimsand especially Kant's claim that "the impression of the senses itself precedes all judgment of the understanding" -have an important practical significance, and indeed deserve the attention of students of Kant's moral and political philosophy for how they shape Kant's views on the practical dangers of religious enthusiasm. It is to this claim that the remainder of this section is largely dedicated. But before turning directly to this we need to note two further reasons for the significance of these claims. Thus in the second place, these claims attest to Kant's insistence on the primacy of sensation in the mid-1760s -a conviction for which Rousseau is hardly the sole source but for which he is quite likely the most proximate source. For students of Kant's intellectual development this is especially important insofar as it suggests the degree to which Kant understood the Empfindungen central to his writings of the 1760s not merely through the lens of the moral psychology that he inherited from the British moral sentimentalists, but also through the lens of sensory epistemology that he inherited from Rousseau, and which Rousseau in turn had inherited from the post-Lockean tradition as it had developed in France, and particularly as it had been conveyed to him by such authors as Condillac and Helvétius. Third, these claims deserve the attention of students of Kant's later critical and post-critical writings. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive comparison of Kant's epistemological commitments in his pre-critical and critical phases. Yet insofar as the quite literal point of departure in the first Critique is the claim that "experience is without doubt the first product that our understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible sensations" and hence "all our cognition begins with experience" (A 1/B 1; cf. A 19 f./B 33 f. and A 298/B 355) it is possible that in his early engagement with Rousseau lie the seeds of his critical understanding of empirical cognition, as well as his claim in the "Apology for Sensibility" to be found in the Anthropology that "without sensibility there would be no material that could be processed for the use of legislative understanding" (A 256 f.; Ak 7:144). In this sense, the pre-critical Kant's commitment to the priority of sensation to judgment stands as a useful pole against which the evolution of his mature views on the relationship of concepts to intuitions might be measured.25 Attending to Kant's debts to Rousseau's conceptions of the relationship of sensation to cognition in the 1760s can thus help attune us to the significance of sensation even in Kant's later works.26 So too it can help to clarify another side of the critical Kant's relationship to Rousseau. Rousseau remains notorious today as one of the eighteenth century's most vehement critics of reason and champions of sentiment. Yet attending to the epistemic claims of Emile makes clear that this reductionist sketch hardly does justice to the complexity of Rousseau's position. Even as he warned of the dangers inherent to the instrumental rationality characteristic of commercial modernity, Rousseau yet encouraged development of an intellectual reason grounded in accurate and cultivated sensation. Kant's conception of the role of sensibility in understanding suggests a parallel concern -a concern that can be overlooked in light of the obvious differences in tone and target that distinguish Rousseau's critiques of reason, as famously developed in the second Discourse, from Kant's critiques of pure reason, as famously developed in his treatments of the paralogisms and antinomies of the transcendental dialectic.
An adequate treatment of this question would again require a study of its own. For present purposes, our more immediate concern is to determine, in light of Kant's close following of Rousseau's understanding of the sensory foundations of cognition in the 1760s, why he was so interested in this problem -a concern that brings us back to the practical significance of these claims, noted above. For in fact Kant's motive for documenting and emphasizing the cognitive primacy of sensation seems to owe much to his concerns regarding the practical dangers inherent in the attempt to build human knowledge on faulty epistemic -and specifically faulty sensationalist -foundations. These concerns are ubiquitous in Kant's writings of the 1760s. In his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), for example, Kant makes particularly clear why what he calls "the deception of the senses" is a matter of even graver concern than "the deception of reason":
The systematic delusion of the senses (eine zusammenhängende Täuschung der Sinne) in general is a much more remarkable phenomenon than the deception of reason, the causes of which are well enough known. The deception of reason could to a large extent be prevented by subjecting the powers of the mind to control by the will, and by exercising rather more restraint over idle inquisitiveness. The deception of the senses, on the other hand, concerns the ultimate foundation of all our judgments, and if that foundation were defective, there is little that the rules of logic could do to remedy the situation! (DSS 347; Ak 2:360 f.)
26 On this front, see e. g. the influence of sensation in Kant's later pedagogical theory as described in Reisert 2012, 21 f. Kant's worry here is twofold. First, he insists that to the degree to which they resist amelioration by the application of logic's rules, deceptions of the senses are difficult to cure once they have taken root. Second, and perhaps more importantly, insofar as sensation is necessarily the first stage in our epistemic development, any errors made in that stage will be passed down and indeed compounded in the later stages of our epistemic development. On such grounds Kant would continue to emphasize throughout the 1760s and even into his "Inaugural Dissertation" of 1770 the crucial implications of the "lack of accord between the sensitive faculty and the faculty of the understanding" (ID 379; Ak 2:389), and insist that "great care must be taken lest the principles which are native to sensitive cognition transgress their limits, and affect what belongs to the understanding" (ID 407; Ak 2:411). This is a concern that also takes center stage in the "Essay", which emphasizes that not only are the passions "the moving forces of the will" but indeed if "a passion is especially powerful, the capacity of the understanding is of little help against it" (EMH 67; Ak 2:261). In general then "the senses provide a far greater conviction regarding actual things than an inference of reason", and "someone bewitched by these chimeras can never be brought by reasoning to doubting the actuality of his presumed sensation (seiner vermeinten Empfindung)" (EMH 71; Ak 2:265).
Kant thus clearly shares Rousseau's concern with developing cognition in accord with the stages and order prescribed by nature, and particularly in making sure that no stage oversteps its boundaries. At the same time, Kant's own reasons for insisting on this point speak to a specific normative concern that goes beyond the concerns with which Rousseau was most directly engaged. This concerns the pernicious practical effects of religious enthusiasm. In several of his writings from the 1760s, and especially in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Kant frames the practical problem of religious enthusiasm precisely as a problem of corrupted or misinterpreted sensation, and suggests that the consequences of this misinterpretation of sensation are to be numbered among our greatest practical dangers. The Dreams of a Spirit-Seer is itself a text in which Rousseau's influence is evident throughout; its descriptions of "the drive, which makes us so heavily and universally dependent on the judgment of others" (DSS 321; Ak 2:334) is as much a reference to Rousseau's conception of amour-propre in the second Discourse as its claim that "we are dependent upon the rule of the general will […] which confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity" (DSS 322; Ak 2:335) seems to reflect the influence of Rousseau's political theory in the Social Contract. But for present purposes, what matters is the way in which the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer develops its account of sensory epistemology:
It is also highly probable that the concepts of spirit-forms, inculcated into us by education, provide the sick mind with materials for its delusive imaginings, and that a brain which was free from all such prejudices, even if it were affected by some disturbance, would not so easily hatch out such images. Furthermore, it can also be seen from this that, since the malady of the fantastical visionary does not really affect the understanding but rather involves the deception of the senses (die Täuschung der Sinne), the wretched victim cannot banish his illusions by means of subtle reasoning. He cannot do so because, true or illusory, the impression of the senses itself precedes all judgment of the understanding (die wahre oder scheinbare Empfindung der Sinne selbst vor allem Urteil des Vorstandes vorhergeht) and possesses an immediate certainty, which is far stronger than all other persuasion. (DSS 335; Ak 2:347) Here Kant nods at his broader goal in the essay: namely to provide what he in one of its chapter headings calls an "anti-cabbala" sufficient "to cancel community with the spirit-world" (DSS 329; Ak 2:342). In particular, Kant's aim is to document the basic epistemic illegitimacy of the attempts of human beings whose knowledge is founded on sensory impressions to access the spirit-realm -itself a claim that deserves attention as an anticipation of themes in Kant's later work, and especially his crucial distinction between our epistemic capacities to access the phenomenal and noumenal realms.
That the pre-critical Kant was deeply concerned by the troubling practical implications of this epistemic error is clear. Throughout his writings of the mid1760s he returns frequently to the question of fanaticism, a condition that he identifies as the direct consequence of the illusions of the senses. Kant admits that this propensity can be harmless, and even beneficial. In the "Essay", he thus explains that "self-deception in sensations is very common", and "as long as it is only moderate" can be excusable (EMH 71; Ak 2:265) insofar as "the soul of every human being is occupied even in the healthiest state with painting all kinds of images of things that are not present, or with completing some imperfect resemblance in the representation of present things through one or another chimerical trait which the creative poetic capacity draws into the sensation" (EMH 70; Ak 2:264). This propensity, when well directed, can even be positively admirable. Kant names Rousseau explicitly in this context. Picturing Rousseau "among the doctors of the Sorbonne", he imagines "loud derision and a hundred voices shout" to condemn him as a "fantast". Yet Kant himself insists that Rousseau is in fact an example of one "more excited by a moral sentiment (eine moralische Empfindung) than a principle", and insofar as he is moved by "moral sensations that are in themselves good", Rousseau deserves to be seen not as suffering from an unhealthy fanaticism but as exhibiting an admirable enthusiasm -a point Kant means as a complement, given his insistence that "nothing great has ever been accomplished in the world without [enthusiasm]" (EMH 72 f.; Ak 2:267).27
Yet Kant also insists there is a short slide from the enthusiast to the fanatic. The fantast is precisely one who suffers from "self-deception in sensations (Selbstbetrug in den Empfindungen)" (EMH 71; Ak 2:265), and the most dangerous fantast is "a deranged person with presumed immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the powers of the heavens". That Kant found this particu lar form of sensory illusion tremendously worrisome is clear: "human nature knows no more dangerous illusion", he claims (EMH 73; Ak 2:267; cf. DSS 316; Ak 2:329).28 What chiefly worries Kant is the potential for distortion or corruption of the natural primacy of sensation to the point that what might ordinarily be only a "mental weakness" can "degenerate into actual fantastic mania" (EMH 71; Ak 2:265). And it is on this note that the Observations itself ends, condemning those "heroic fantasts" and -in a line in which Rousseau's influence has been seen29 -calling us to rededicate ourselves to the search for "the as yet undiscovered secret of education" which might enable us "early to raise the moral feeling in the breast of every young citizen of the world into an active sentiment (tätigen Empfindung)" and thereby inoculate us against the predilection to phantasm (O 61 f.; Ak 2:255; cf. O 29; Ak 2:214 f.; and O 35; Ak 2:222).
Seen in this way, Kant's pre-critical treatment of the relationship of sensation to judgment in the Observations and elsewhere takes on a unique significance. The Observations presents itself in its first line as an essay in delineating and classifying "different sentiments" (verschiedene Empfindungen) (O 23; Ak 2:207), and while it will also speak of "sensuous feeling" (sinnliche Gefühl) (O 24; Ak 2:208), it tends to consistently employ the language of Empfindungen to describe what are alternately called in English either sentiments or sensations (cf. e. g. the translation at O 25 to Ak 2:210, ll. 7 f.). Indeed while the Observations has been often mined for what it might reveal of Kant's views on women and race and for how it might foreshadow his mature understanding of human dignity and the categorical imperative, it also deserves the attention of those interested in Kant's understanding of the intimate relation of "what the understanding sees (was der Verstand einsehe)" to "what the feeling is sensitive to (was das Gefühl empfinde)" (O 38; Ak 2:225) -a relation that Kant in his pre-critical period, as well as his critical works, clearly realized has key practical implications.
The Final End of Education
Kant's pre-critical writings, taken altogether, suggest the degree of his indebtedness to Rousseau, and to Rousseau's understanding of the import of the stages of cognitive development in particular. But how did his engagement with Rousseau shape Kant's practices as an educator? Kant himself was of course not directly engaged in the project of early childhood education; unlike the tutor Jean-Jacques, Kant the Privatdozent only emerged as a figure in his students' lives in their adolescence. Yet even here Rousseau clearly helped to define Kant's own self-conception as an educator of university-age students. At the beginning of Book IV of Emile, in which Rousseau sets out to describe the transition in educational methods necessary as Emile himself transitions from childhood to adolescence, we are told:
The study suitable for man is that of his relations. So long as he knows himself only in his physical being, he ought to study himself in his relations with things. This is the job of his childhood. When he begins to sense his moral being, he ought to study himself in his relations with men. This is the job of his whole life, beginning from the point we have now reached. (E 13:364; OC 4:493) At this moment, Emile's entire education shifts; where before the principal focus of the tutor was the child's relationship with the external world, mediated and known to Emile via his senses and his experiences, now the tutor's focus shifts to Emile's relationships with others beyond himself. These relationships with others take on a variety of forms, including Emile's romantic relationship with Sophie, his spiritual relationship to God, and his practical relationships with his fellow-citizens. Much of Book V of Emile is dedicated to training Emile for these practical relationships; both his study of the basic principles of the social contract and the foreign travel that his tutor mandates are meant specifically to provide him with a knowledge of men and an introduction to his duties as a citizen, each of which are indispensable to his practical welfare. It is precisely this same project that forms a principal aim of Kant's own methods as a university educator in the 1760s.
In the "Announcement", Kant prominently advertises that his courses will focus on four specific subjects: metaphysics, logic, ethics, and "physical, moral, and political geography" (AL 299; Ak 2:312). For the student of Kant's relationship to Rousseau, the last two subjects are especially crucial. Kant's lectures on geography deserve particular attention. In one sense, as has been shown, Kant's ambition on these fronts is to instruct his students in the sort of practical wisdom and judgment necessary to get along in the world. But Kant is also after something more here. In this respect, he explains with specific reference to moral geography, this subject considers man, throughout the world, from the point of view of the variety of his natural properties and the differences in that feature of man which is moral in character. The consideration of these things is at once very important and also highly stimulating as well. Unless these matters are considered, general judgments (allgemeine Urteile) about man would scarcely be possible. The comparison of human beings with each other, and the comparison of man today with the moral state of man in earlier times, furnishes us with a comprehensive map of the human species. (AL 299; Ak 2:312 f.)
Two aspects of this description are striking, and each concerns Kant's engagement with Rousseau. First, Kant here follows Rousseau's insistence on the importance of training the student in being able to reach a true appreciation of human nature as a result of cross-cultural and cross-temporal researches into the varying ways in which human nature has emerged in varying contexts. In this sense, Kant follows Rousseau's substantive intention. But he also follows Rousseau's method. In this sense, this capacity of the student is itself predicated on a specific capacity to make "comparisons" that afford the possibility of genuine "judgments". In exercising this capacity, the students of Kant's geography course are not simply learning about the world in which they must live and act, but also are being trained in the skills of accurate comparison and judgment that Rousseau repeatedly insists are the proper focus of cognitive development after our sensory training is complete.
Even greater and more obvious than Rousseau's influence on Kant's account of his intentions for physical geography is Rousseau's influence on Kant's account of his intentions for his ethics lectures. Previous scholars have noted certain elements of this influence.30 But its full extent remains to be uncovered. In the first place, Kant here testifies to the degree to which he follows not simply the British ethicists' conceptions of moral sentiment, but specifically Rousseau's emphasis on the good heart; hence his insistence that "the distinction between good and evil in actions, and the judgment of moral rightness, can be known, easily and accurately, by the human heart through what is called sentiment [was man Sentiment nennt] , and that without the elaborate necessity of proofs" (AL 297; Ak 2:311). But Kant also goes further than merely restating Rousseau's privileging of heart over head in ethics. In his key statement on method in the study of man, he explains:
30 See e. g. the editorial note to the English translation of AL at 448 n. 17, in which it is claimed "Kant is alluding throughout this paragraph to Rousseau." So too the editor of the French translation of the text in the Pléiade edition suggests that it "paraît incontestable" that Kant has Rousseau in mind here, and specifically his doctrine of "simplicité naturelle" [Ferrari in Aliqué, ed. 1980 , vol. 1, p. 1534 In so doing, I shall make clear what method ought to be adopted in the study of man. And by man here I do not only mean man as he is distorted by the mutable form which is conferred upon him by the contingencies of his condition, and who, as such, has nearly always been misunderstood even by philosophers. I rather mean the unchanging nature of man and his distinctive position within the creation. My purpose will be to establish which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of primitive innocence and which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of wise innocence. It is also my purpose to establish what, by contrast, the rule of man's behavior is when, transcending the two types of limit, he strives to attain the highest level of physical or moral excellence, though falling short of that attainment to a greater or lesser degree. This method of moral enquiry is an admirable discovery of our times, which, when viewed in the full extent of its programme, was entirely unknown to the ancients. (AL 298; Ak 2:311 f.) Several elements of this account deserve notice for the window they open onto Kant's debts to Rousseau. First, Kant's concluding reference to the notion that the method here described is "an admirable discovery of our times" that was "entirely unknown to the ancients" clearly refers to Rousseau, evident from Kant's claim in the "Remarks" that "Rousseau's book serves to improve on the ancients" (R 72; Ak 20:9).31 More substantively, Kant's note on the difference between the "unchanging nature of man" and the "mutable form" that he has adopted as a consequence of "the contingencies of his position" which the philosophers have misunderstood not only replicates in some obvious sense Rousseau's distinction between the man of nature and the corrupt civilized man on which Rousseau's "Preface" to the Second Discourse focuses, but also, in emphasizing the necessity of an appreciation of our "distinctive position within the creation", Kant sounds the distinctive note on which Rousseau's "Preface" ends (SD 3:16; OC 3:128) .32 But most importantly, in distinguishing a state of "primitive innocence" from a state of "wise innocence", Kant reveals the degree to which he was aware of the unique nature of Rousseau's subtle project.33 Rousseau, to little avail, often warned that he should not be mistaken for wanting to take us back to the primitive state. But despite his prominent and explicit differentiation of the savage as a "stupid, limited animal" from the "intelligent being" characteristic of the civil 31 See also Ferrari 1978, 191 state (SC 4:141; OC 3:364) as well as his clear insistence that in educating Emile he sought to form not simply a natural man but a natural man in society, many later readers often mistook Rousseau's intention. But Kant offers a more charitable and more accurate alternative. In the "Remarks", he explains:
If one considers the happiness of the savage it is not in order to return to the woods, but only in order to see what one has lost while gaining elsewhere; so that in the enjoyment and exercise of social opulence, one would not, with unhappy and unnatural inclinations, cling to the former, and would remain a civilized human being of nature. That consideration serves as the standard. For nature never makes a human being into a citizen, and his inclinations and endeavors are merely aimed at the simple state of life. (R 87; Ak 20:31) Kant's conscious identification of the distinction between the natural man and the "civilized human being of nature", coupled with his awareness of the distinction between primitive innocence and wise innocence, points not only to an insightful reading of Rousseau's intentions, but also offers a helpful glimpse into Kant's own intentions as an educator. When Kant wrote, in the Dreams of a SpiritSeer, that "true wisdom is the companion of simplicity", and specifically a state in which "the heart commands the understanding" -indeed a state that "makes the elaborate apparatus of learning superfluous, its purpose needing only the means which lie within the reach of everyone" (DSS 358; Ak 2:372; cf. O 62; Ak 2:255) -he attests to his commitment to Rousseau's vision of education for everyman.
Kant thus quite consciously conceived the product of his education in terms and categories drawn from Rousseau. Again, this is especially evident in the mid1770s; when Kant celebrates Basedow's Philanthropin as "the genuine educational institute that is fitting to nature as well as civil purposes", and insists that "animal creatures are made into human beings only by education", his conscious dedication to the project of Emile is clear (EP 100; Ak 2:447 and EP 102; Ak 2:449). But this same intention is evident in the "Announcement" as well. There Kant, in perhaps the most important substantive claim of the essay, insists that he does not merely want to teach ideas but to teach the capacity to generate ideas: "it is not thoughts but thinking which the understanding ought to learn. It ought to be led, if you wish, but not carried, so that in the future it will be capable of walking on its own, and doing so without stumbling" (AL 292; Ak 2:306). Kant's image manages to combine one of Rousseau's and Kant's favorite metaphors; just as one of the key projects for Emile would be to develop independence in walking, so too Kant sought, in his Aufklärung essay and elsewhere, to develop minds capable of functioning independently of the Gängelwagen on which immature minds are compelled to lean (WE 17; Ak 8:35 f.). Rousseau of course was hardly the only contemporary thinker to extol intellectual independence, and it would be absurd to suggest that Kant owed this idea exclusively to Rousseau; as others have noted, encouraging intellectual independence was a primary theme in Thomasius and the German Enlightenment more generally.34 Yet clearly Kant's encounter with Rousseau's unremitting insistence on this claim in Emile would only have served to reinforce it in his mind. Kant indeed merely spoke for the tutor in insisting that it is not the "illusion of science" that one must teach, but rather "extending the capacity for understanding of young people entrusted to one's care and educating them to the point where they will be able in the future to acquire a more mature insight of their own" (AL 293; Ak 2:307 35 See also Schmucker, who rightly says of these passages in the "Announcement" that "Der Rousseausche Hintergrund ist auch hier unverkennbar" (1961, 149 f.) . 36 Author's Note: For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author is extremely grateful to Patrick Frierson, Susan Shell, and two anonymous referees.
